Executive Summary

September 30, 2026 marks both the end of the remaining phase of the international coalition’s mission in Iraq and the deadline for confining weapons to the hands of the state. It is unlikely, however, to be sufficient to resolve the file. The core difficulty is not the principle of confining weapons to the state, but the sequencing of obligations and guarantees between Baghdad and Washington on one side and the refusing factions on the other: the government and Washington are demanding tangible progress on bringing weapons under state control, while the factions that refuse to hand them over tie any such step to a full American withdrawal and to guarantees of Iraqi sovereignty.

To date, progress has gone no further than partial administrative arrangements within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), with no public inventory of specific weapons and no clear implementation timetable. This paper therefore anticipates a limited settlement that defers a decisive outcome, while the risks of escalation and division within the Shia house remain. It recommends separating the legal deadline from the physical handover of weapons; classifying and inventorying weapons in a verifiable manner; integrating individuals rather than formations; and tying all of this to a roadmap for reforming the security sector and the PMF, underpinned by reciprocal internal and external guarantees. Sovereignty is not achieved by political declaration, but through a phased, enforceable, and accountable mechanism.

First: September 30, A Date of Three Tests

On September 27, 2024, Baghdad and Washington agreed on a phased timetable to end the international coalition’s mission in Iraq. The first phase was to conclude in September 2025 with the withdrawal of coalition forces, the handover of their bases, and a transition to a bilateral security cooperation framework. The second phase extends to September 2026, allowing the Syria-related mission to continue from a platform in the Kurdistan Region. In January 2026, Iraq announced the completion of the first phase, and on July 15, the US Department of War confirmed September 30 as the end date of the second phase, following its secretary’s meeting with the Iraqi Prime Minister at the White House.

On the domestic track, the government notified the armed groups that September 30 marks the closing of the file on weapons outside the state framework. Government spokesman Haidar al-Aboudi said on June 29 that anything remaining after that date would be “subject to legal action. Speaking from Washington on July 14, Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi reiterated that confining weapons to the state is a “non-negotiable” clause of his government’s program,  language reinforced by President Nizar Amidi, who stressed that the decision is “irreversible”

Yet this alignment of dates, readable as an attempt to tie the transition of the security mission to progress on bringing weapons under state control, has complicated the political calculus. On July 28, US Central Command and the Saudi Ministry of Defense carried out joint strikes on logistics sites and weapons depots belonging to pro-Iranian factions inside Iraq, in response to attacks on Saudi oil facilities launched from Iraqi territory. Baghdad condemned the strikes and denied any prior knowledge of them, contradicting what the American president had said. The episode handed the factions and their allies an opening to press their argument that the state cannot demand the surrender of weapons before it demonstrates that it can protect its own territory and prevent external strikes. It also placed the Prime Minister under domestic pressure to postpone or freeze the file.

The public dispute, then, appears to be less about the principle of confining weapons to the state than about the ordering of entitlements and the guarantees attached to them. Washington ties any expansion of the security partnership to tangible progress on weapons control, while the factions that refuse to hand over their arms demand a full American withdrawal rather than a mere redeployment or a shift to a new security formula. Each side insists its own terms be met first.

On September 30, the Iraqi state faces three interlocking tests: ending the international coalition’s mission, confining weapons to its own hands, and proving it can defend its sovereignty and keep its territory from becoming an arena of conflict.

Second: What Has Actually Changed?

Since June, three factions have taken limited steps in this direction. Saraya al-Salam (the Peace Brigades) held a handover ceremony in Samarra on June 4, while Asaib Ahl al-Haq and the Imam Ali Brigades announced the transfer of their brigades within the Popular Mobilization Authority to the government, with the backing of the Coordination Framework, which authorized the Prime Minister to take the necessary measures.

These steps, however, did not extend to all factions, nor did they amount to surrendering the weapons themselves. At least six factions refuse to proceed with disarmament, led by Kataib Hezbollah, whose strength is estimated at 10,000 to 15,000 fighters, and Harakat al-Nujaba, estimated at 8,000 to 10,000. As their leaders’ statements make clear, their positions are bound up with the continued American military presence and with the dynamics of the regional conflict, above all the war between Iran, Israel, and the United States. On August 3, Kataib Hezbollah issued its first outright public rejection since this track accelerated, declaring a commitment to developing its capabilities rather than handing them over.

Three observations define the nature of the progress achieved so far.

First, transferring the “administration” of brigades within the PMF is an administrative arrangement, not the surrender of an arsenal or the removal of armed capability. Conflating the two inflates what has actually been accomplished.

Second, the file still has no announced implementation timetable. A military spokesman confirmed in June that the process was “not bound by a specific timetable,” making September 30 a political date rather than a fully determined schedule.

Third, the problem is not confined to the factions’ weapons. Current estimates point to roughly fifteen million unregulated weapons across Iraq, while the National Arms Register project remains in its early stages.

What has been achieved so far is a limited rearrangement within the PMF, not a genuine transition to a state monopoly on weapons.

Third: Three Tracks After September 30

Scenario 1: Handover and integration under two regulators, low probability

The refusing factions hand over their heavy and high-end weapons under a documented inventory; their fighters are integrated individually into the regular forces; and their leadership moves into political activity. In parallel, cooperation with Washington proceeds on training and intelligence sharing, along the lines agreed during the July visit.

This path requires explicit Iranian cover, written security guarantees, and a financial and social program to absorb the fighters. Those conditions are not sufficiently in place today. The Prime Minister’s talks in Tehran were held discreetly; the government stated before the visit that the weapons file is a sovereign Iraqi matter not to be discussed outside Baghdad; and official statements did not reveal whether it was raised in the closed meetings. The indicator that this scenario is materializing would be a joint inventory announcement specifying verifiable dates, locations, and quantities.

Scenario 2: A partial settlement that defers the decisive outcome, most likely

Secondary or symbolic weapons are handed over, administrative arrangements are completed for factions already inside the PMF, and on September 30, the government announces the “completion of the first phase.” High-end weaponry, including missiles and drones, remains outside any declared inventory or is folded into vague arrangements.

This path yields the government a limited political achievement, buys the factions additional time, and keeps American pressure in place. Iraqi analysts have suggested the deadline will slip beyond September 30, possibly to the end of the year, given the difficulty of completing the inventory within the allotted period and the wish to avoid a clash with the refusing factions. Its principal cost, however, is that it merely reschedules the crisis rather than resolves it and depletes the state’s credibility when it claims progress unsupported by concrete action. The practical indicator would be official rhetoric about “gradualism” and a “first phase” unaccompanied by published figures or mechanisms.

Scenario 3: Refusal opens a security and political rift, moderate probability, rising in the months after the deadline

Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba persist in refusing to hand over their weapons, and the state faces a test of enforcement, or their positions are struck again from outside in response to attacks launched from Iraqi territory, renewing the cycle of escalation. The danger is not limited to a confrontation between the state and the factions; it extends to division within the Shia house, as factions that have accepted the state’s arrangements may find a direct interest in denying the refusers military and political advantage.

The Sadiqoun movement’s insistence on effective guarantees before completing the process and its criticism of the government’s silence in the face of the strikes reveal the early signs of this tension. The indicator of this scenario would be a limited engagement between a regular force and an armed faction, or the retreat of a significant bloc within the Coordination Framework from its support for the decision.

The real test after September 30 is not the declaration of success, but the state’s ability to convert the weapons file from a temporary settlement into a verifiable and enforceable procedure.

Fourth: Confining Weapons and Reforming the Popular Mobilization

Confining weapons to the state is not merely a matter of inventorying pieces or of how well the police and regular forces are armed. It depends on the political and institutional cover that prevents the measure from becoming a formality without effect. The statement issued on August 5 by the State Administration Coalition, backing the confinement of weapons to the state and the prevention of Iraqi territory being used as a launchpad against neighboring countries, can be read as a partial withdrawal of political cover from weapons outside the state. Its effect will remain limited, however, unless it is followed by a firm public commitment from the signatory parties and a mechanism that prevents a return to populist rhetoric or a stalling of implementation at the first regional crisis.

The concept of confining weapons should therefore be linked to structural reform of the Popular Mobilization, as the institution most exposed to the consequences of the overlap between state and factions and to external bombardment. That means transforming it into a disciplined national institution and preventing its use as cover for independent armed structures. Reform requires revising the criteria for selecting and renewing its leadership, disentangling its consultation and coordination practices from Iranian frameworks, and reviewing the role of the Muhandis General Company and of units that exceed clear operational need, including its air arm. These are files in which Iraq’s need for security sovereignty intersects with American objections.

Sovereignty is not measured by a declared date, but by a clear mechanism that makes weapons outside the state a cost rather than an asset.

Takeaways

September 30 will not resolve the file of weapons outside the state, but it will expose the limits of political will and the government’s capacity to move from pledge to implementation. The most likely path is a partial settlement that defers the decisive moment, unless the deadline is paired with a declared inventory, individual integration, reciprocal internal and external guarantees, and coherent political cover for PMF reform within the security system. What is needed is not another declaration, but a mechanism that makes the state’s monopoly on weapons a measurable and enforceable reality.