How Iraq can transform associated gas into electricity,
by 2030

Ahmad Zainy Al-Yasry

Executive Summary

GLOBAL FLARING: 167 bcm – 2025, highest since 2019

IRAQ FLARING: 18.18 bcm – 2024 documented baseline

MARKETED GAS: 11.073 bcm – Iraq, 2024

GAS PARADOX: 164% – flared gas vs marketed gas

Associated gas flaring is no longer a marginal environmental issue, nor merely an operational problem inside oil fields. The latest global figures show that flaring has become a file of energy security, finance, emissions, and oil reputation. In 2025, global flaring rose to 167 bcm, the highest level since 2019, with a 16% increase compared with 2012. This wasted gas represents an energy resource close to the gas consumption of the African continent. In 2025, the world flared about 167 bcm of gas, a quantity larger than the volume of marketed gas crossing the Strait of Hormuz into global markets. This shows that reducing flaring is not only an environmental issue; it is an energy security issue.

The paradox increases when the World Bank’s Global Gas Flaring Tracker Report 2026 indicates that countries such as Iraq, Egypt and India import gas or energy from abroad while, at the same time, they flare large quantities of associated gas within their own territories. For Iraq, this means that part of the solution exists inside the country itself: if associated gas is captured, processed and connected to power plants and industry, imports can be reduced, pressure on the dollar can be eased, and national energy security can be strengthened.

Iraq possesses large proven natural gas reserves, and it produces oil in large quantities that generate associated gas. However, it does not convert enough of this gas into electricity, industry, or a market. According to the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies series based on the Global Gas Flaring Tracker Report 2026, Iraq’s gas flaring reached about 18.18 bcm in 2024, compared with 12.70 bcm in 2012; that is an increase of 5.48 bcm, or about 43%, over 12 years.

The most important Iraqi paradox is that the gas flared in 2024 was larger than the gas actually marketed. According to figures from the OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2025, and as shown in OPEC’s natural gas tables in Section 9 of the bulletin, Iraq had proven natural gas reserves and marketed gas production. Iraq’s marketed gas production in 2024 reached about 11.073 bcm, while flaring reached 18.18 bcm. This means that the flared gas equals approximately 164% of marketed gas. This reveals that the problem is not scarcity of the resource, but weak conversion of the resource into energy, market, and industry.

Central message of the report: Associated gas in Iraq is not only an environmental or electricity file. It is a sovereign bridge between oil, the budget, electricity, the dollar, and industry. Every delay in capturing it means that Iraq burns local gas and then pays in dollars to buy its substitute from abroad or to compensate for the energy shortage.

1 Global Picture of Associated Gas Flaring

The global problem is large, concentrated, and increasingly linked to energy security rather than only emissions.

1.1 Global flaring increased instead of declining

According to the Global Gas Flaring Tracker Report 2026, global flaring reached about 167 bcm in 2025. This is the highest level since 2019 and represents an increase of 23 bcm compared with 2012. More importantly, about 10 bcm of this increase occurred in 2025 alone, which means that the problem did not retreat despite international commitments to reduce flaring. Flaring intensity also increased by about 3% in 2025, meaning the amount of gas flared per barrel of oil produced.

Global flaring rose despite commitments

Figure 1: Global gas flaring, 2012 and 2025

Economic scale of routine flaring abatement

Figure 2: Potential revenues and estimated upfront spending

Reference: World Bank / GFMR, Global Gas Flaring Tracker Report 2026.

Table 1: Global flaring indicators

Global indicator	Number	Significance
Global flaring in 2025	167 bcm	Highest level since 2019
Increase compared with 2012	23 bcm	16% increase
Increase in 2025 alone	10 bcm	Almost half of the increase since 2012
Change in flaring intensity in 2025	Approximately +3%	Oil production alone does not explain the increase in flaring
Value of revenues from ending routine flaring globally	USD 54 billion	Flaring is a wasted economic resource
Estimated cost of global reduction	USD 70-100 billion	Finance and implementation are the main obstacle

Reference: World Bank / GFMR, Global Gas Flaring Tracker Report 2026.

The World Bank report explains that the use of associated gas can support energy security, electricity, and clean cooking, and that LPG can be produced from associated gas to serve households and small industry. It also estimates that the possible revenues from ending routine flaring globally amount to USD 54 billion, against an estimated initial investment need of about USD 70-100 billion. This means that the problem is not only technical; the technology exists, but the core obstacles are weak regulation, lack of capital, absence of guaranteed gas markets, and weak prioritization of the flaring file as an operational and sovereign priority.

1.2 The problem is concentrated in a small number of countries

The GFMR 2026 report shows that only nine countries account for about 83% of global flaring in 2025. These countries are Russia, Iran, Iraq, Venezuela, Mexico, Libya, Algeria, Nigeria, and the United States. In contrast, the remaining more than 90 countries account for only 17% of global flaring, although they account for 54% of global oil production. This means that oil production does not necessarily require high flaring. There are large producing countries that have been able to produce oil with relatively low flaring levels, such as Saudi Arabia, Norway, and Kazakhstan.

Flaring is more concentrated than oil production

Why this matters for Iraq: Iraq is inside the first group. Therefore, any credible Iraqi reduction is not only a domestic gain; it also affects the global flaring indicator and the future carbon reputation of Iraqi oil.

Figure 3: Share of top 9 countries vs remaining countries

Reference: World Bank / GFMR, Global Gas Flaring Tracker Report 2026.

Table 2: Concentration of global flaring

Group	Share of global flaring 2025	Share of global oil production	Significance
Top 9 flaring countries	83%	Approximately 46%	The problem is concentrated and not globally equal
Remaining 90+ countries	17%	54%	Oil can be produced with low flaring
Iraq within the first group	Yes	Large oil producer	Any Iraqi reduction has global and local impact

Reference: World Bank / GFMR, Global Gas Flaring Tracker Report 2026.

This point is important for Iraq because reducing Iraqi flaring will not merely be a national improvement; it will be influential in the global indicator itself. Iraq is not a small case; it is one of the centers of the global problem.

1.3 Commitments to reduce flaring by 2030 are not sufficient without implementation

The Zero Routine Flaring by 2030 initiative, launched by the World Bank and the United Nations in 2015, aims to end routine flaring by the end of this decade. In the GFMR 2025 report, the initiative included 36 governments and 60 oil and gas companies, together representing about 60% of global flaring in 2024. However, the report itself states that the signatory governments and companies are still far from the required path, and that reaching the 2030 target requires very large annual reductions. It even indicates a need of about 40% annually among the committed group in order to reach the target within the remaining time.

The report also states that some signatory countries achieved good reductions, but this progress was offset by increases in major flaring countries, including Iraq, Russia, and Mexico, which together recorded an increase of about 12 bcm since 2012 within the committed group.

2 The Global LNG Market and Why It Increases the Importance of Local Gas

LNG provides flexibility, but it is not a low-risk permanent substitute for domestic associated gas.

2.1 LNG is not always a comfortable alternative

The IGU World LNG Report 2026 shows that global liquefied natural gas trade reached about 436.98 million tonnes in 2025, an increase of 6.3% from 2024. The largest exporters were the United States with 110.74 million tonnes, Qatar with 81.51 million tonnes, and Australia with 80.32 million tonnes. Europe also increased its imports of LNG by about 26.1 million tonnes to 126.2 million tonnes, while Asia remained a key center of global demand.

Top LNG exporters in 2025

Figure 4: Largest LNG exporters in 2025

Europe pull matters

Figure 5: Europe’s LNG import profile

Reference: International Gas Union, World LNG Report 2026.

Table 3: Selected LNG market indicators in 2025

Indicator	Number
Global LNG trade in 2025	436.98 million tonnes
Growth rate from 2024	6.3%
United States exports	110.74 million tonnes
Qatar exports	81.51 million tonnes
Australia exports	80.32 million tonnes
Europe imports	126.2 million tonnes
Increase in Europe imports	+26.1 million tonnes

Reference: International Gas Union, World LNG Report 2026.

This is important for Iraq because LNG is a global market in which Asia and Europe compete. It is not a guaranteed-price source. Therefore, LNG or FSRU should not be allowed to become a permanent substitute for local associated gas. Yes, LNG can be an insurance policy, seasonal or emergency-based, especially during the summer peak or when external supplies are interrupted. However, it is not the foundation of energy sovereignty.

2.2 The Hormuz crisis and shipping reveal the fragility of dependence on the global market

The IGU report shows that the LNG shipping market was strongly affected in 2026 because of the Hormuz crisis. Spot shipping rates east of Suez rose from about USD 14,250/day in early February to a peak of USD 300,000/day on 5 March, then declined but remained close to USD 100,000/day in late April.

LNG shipping rates east of Suez spiked during the Hormuz crisis

Figure 6: LNG shipping rate indicator east of Suez, 2026

Reference: International Gas Union, World LNG Report 2026.

Table 4: LNG shipping rate indicator east of Suez in 2026

LNG shipping rate indicator east of Suez 2026	Number
Early February	USD 14,250/day
2 March	USD 105,000/day
5 March	USD 300,000/day
Late April	Approximately USD 100,000/day

Reference: International Gas Union, World LNG Report 2026.

Importing liquefied natural gas LNG does not mean that Iraq pays only the gas price announced in the market. The true cost includes more than one component: the price of the gas itself, shipping costs, insurance, delay risks, the cost of unloading and regasifying the gas from liquid into gas, and then the cost of transporting it inside Iraq to power plants or factories. Therefore, LNG may appear to be a fast solution, but it becomes expensive if it turns into permanent dependence.

For this reason, the correct rule for Iraq is this: liquefied natural gas is used as a reserve solution when needed, such as the summer peak, emergencies, or interruption of supplies. The basic foundation, however, should be Iraqi associated gas, because it is a local resource that already exists and is burned in the fields. If we capture it, process it, and connect it to electricity and industry, we reduce imports, protect the dollar, and strengthen energy security inside the country.

2.3 Iraq is also mentioned within emerging import markets

The IGU report indicates that several emerging markets, including Iraq, are developing their first LNG import terminals. It also states that floating infrastructure – Floating Storage and Regasification Unit (a floating unit for storing liquefied natural gas and returning it to its gaseous state) – has become a common option because it is faster and less costly than land-based terminals. The report also states that global capacity to convert liquefied natural gas from the liquid state to the gaseous state reached about 1,113.5 million tonnes per year at the end of 2025 across 50 markets, and that many new projects are under construction globally.

Here the Iraqi paradox appears: Iraq may appear as an importer of LNG at the same time as it flares large quantities of associated gas. Therefore, any Iraqi FSRU must be treated as a reserve tool, not as a substitute for capturing local gas.

3 Iraq within the Global Figures

Iraq is not a marginal case in the global flaring problem; it is one of its major centers.

3.1 Iraq is among the major global flarers

The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies shows that nine countries, including Iraq, are continuously the highest flaring countries, and that flaring in these countries rose from 93 bcm in 2012 to 115 bcm in 2024. Their share of global flaring rose from 65% to 76% over the same period, while their share of oil production increased only from 44% to 47%. This means that the increase in flaring is greater than merely the increase in oil production. According to the OIES table based on GFMR, Iraq’s flaring was as follows:

Iraq flaring stabilized at a high plateau after 2016

Figure 7: Iraq gas flaring trend, 2012-2024

Reference: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, NG 204, 2026, based on GFMR data.

Table 5: Iraq gas flaring, 2012-2024

Year	Iraq flaring / bcm	Year	Iraq flaring / bcm
2012	12.70	2019	17.91
2013	13.34	2020	17.37
2014	14.10	2021	17.89
2015	16.31	2022	17.90
2016	17.55	2023	17.69
2017	17.84	2024	18.18
2018	17.77

Reference: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, NG 204, 2026, based on GFMR data.

The conclusion from the table is that Iraq moved from 12.70 bcm in 2012 to 18.18 bcm in 2024. After 2016, the problem was no longer a large annual jump as much as it became stability at a very high level. In other words, the Iraqi oil system adapted to a flaring level close to 18 bcm annually.

3.2 Comparison between Iraq and the world

Table 6: Iraq and the global flaring context

Indicator	Number
Global flaring in 2025	167 bcm
Flaring of the top 9 countries in 2025	83% of total
Iraq flaring in 2024	18.18 bcm
Iraq’s approximate share of 2025 global flaring if compared with the 2024 number	About 10.9%
Increase in Iraq flaring 2012-2024	+5.48 bcm
Percentage increase in Iraq flaring 2012-2024	About 43%

Reference: World Bank / GFMR 2026; Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, NG 204, 2026.

This comparison does not mean that Iraq’s number for 2025 is the same as the 2024 number. It only explains the size of Iraq within the global problem. Even by using the documented 2024 number, Iraq represents a very large share of global flaring.

4 Iraq: What Do These Numbers Mean?

The core issue is not the existence of gas. It is the incomplete conversion of gas into usable value.

4.1 Iraq does not suffer from gas scarcity, but from weak conversion into value

According to the OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2025, Iraq’s proven natural gas reserves in 2024 reached about 3,714 bcm, which is approximately 3.7 trillion cubic meters. This number represents the gas stock that is commercially recoverable according to the definition of proven reserves, and it does not represent annual production. Iraq produced only 11.073 bcm of marketed gas, while according to the GFMR/OIES series it flared about 18.18 bcm. This means that the flared gas in one year equals approximately 164% of marketed Iraqi gas in the same year. This reveals that the problem is not scarcity of the resource, but weak conversion of the resource into energy, market, and industry. To simplify it, we present it in the following table:

Iraq flared more gas than it marketed

Simple reading: For every 100 units of gas Iraq marketed, it flared about 164 units. The issue is therefore not the absence of gas, but the incomplete chain for gathering, processing, transport, and market delivery.

Figure 8: Marketed vs flared gas in Iraq, 2024

Reference: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2025; Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, NG 204, 2026.

Table 7: Three different gas numbers for Iraq

Number	Meaning	Reading
3,714 bcm	Proven gas reserve	Stock underground
11.073 bcm	Marketed gas in 2024	Gas that reached use / market
18.18 bcm	Gas flared in 2024	Gas that came out with oil and was not invested
18.18 / 11.073	1.64	Flared gas equals 164% of marketed gas

Reference: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2025; Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, NG 204, 2026.

In simpler terms, if Iraq markets 100 units of gas, it burns, in return, about 164 units of gas. This does not mean that all flared gas can be immediately converted into a market, because part of it needs processing, compressors, pipelines, connection, and buyers. However, it proves that the issue is not the absence of gas, but the incompleteness of the chain for gathering, processing, and marketing it.

4.2 Numerical conversions for Iraq’s 2024 flaring

Based on the baseline of 18.18 bcm in 2024, the approximate conversions are as follows:

Table 8: Numerical conversions for Iraq’s 2024 flaring

Item	Approximate number
Annual flaring	18.18 bcm
Daily flaring	49.8 million m3/day
Equivalent in cubic feet	1.76 billion cubic feet/day
Energy content	About 655 million MMBtu annually
Theoretical value at USD 4.20/MMBtu	About USD 2.75 billion
Theoretical value at USD 12.16/MMBtu	About USD 7.96 billion
Theoretical value at USD 13.8/MMBtu	About USD 9.04 billion
Theoretical electricity at 50% efficiency	About 11.2 GW continuous

Reference: Calculated from the 18.18 bcm baseline; price references from local gas and international benchmark assumptions discussed in the report.

Theoretical value of the 18.18 bcm flaring baseline under different price assumptions

Figure 9: Theoretical value ranges – not net revenues

Reference: Calculated from the 18.18 bcm baseline.

These figures are not net revenues, and they do not mean that Iraq can tomorrow convert all flaring into electricity or profits. But they mean that the burned resource is not marginal; rather, it is equivalent to a large energy and industrial system.

Table 9: Baseline summary

Indicator	Adopted baseline
Gas flaring – bcm/year	18.18
Million m3/day	49.8
Billion cubic feet/day	1.76
Energy – million MMBtu	655
Theoretical value at USD 4.20/MMBtu	USD 2.75 billion
Theoretical value at USD 13.8/MMBtu	USD 9.04 billion
Theoretical electricity at 50% efficiency	11.2 GW

5 Impact of Associated Gas on Electricity, the Dollar, and Industry

Associated gas sits at the intersection of electricity reliability, fiscal pressure, and industrial diversification.

5.1 Electricity

Associated gas is the shortest bridge between oil production and electricity stability. At the baseline of 18.18 bcm, the theoretical energy is equivalent to about 11.2 GW continuous at combined-cycle efficiency of 50%, before losses from gathering, processing, transportation, and outages. This does not mean that the entire quantity will turn into electricity. It means, however, that solving a significant part of flaring can create a tangible effect on electricity supply.

5.2 The dollar and the budget

In 2024, Iraq achieved oil exports of about USD 100.972 billion, while its imports of goods and services reached USD 90.379 billion. Therefore, reducing imports of gas, electricity or fuel through capturing local gas is not only an energy file. It is also a balance-of-payments and dollar file.

Iraq’s external balance is sensitive to import substitution

Policy implication: Every billion dollars Iraq saves from energy or fuel imports reduces pressure on the dollar and on the budget. Therefore, associated gas should enter financial stability policy, not only electricity policy.

Figure 10: Selected external-sector indicators, 2024

Reference: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2025.

Table 10: Selected Iraqi financial indicators in 2024

Iraqi financial indicator 2024	Number
Oil exports	USD 100.972 billion
Goods and services imports	USD 90.379 billion
Nominal GDP	USD 279.641 billion
Population	46.119 million people

Reference: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2025.

Every billion dollars Iraq saves from energy or fuel imports reduces pressure on the dollar and on the budget. Therefore, associated gas should be included within financial stability policy, not only within electricity policy.

5.3 Industry

Gas should not all go to electricity. After processing, it can be used to produce LPG and NGL, and to supply fertilizer, petrochemical, cement, brick, glass and food industries. The GFMR 2026 report confirms that associated gas can support electricity and clean cooking, and that LPG produced from associated gas serves households and small industry.

Table 11: Potential uses of associated gas in Iraq

Use	Priority	Reason of importance for Iraq
Electricity	Urgent	Reducing outages and supporting Iraq’s summer
Replacing liquid fuel	High	Reducing operating cost or freeing products for export
LPG/NGL	High	Commercial value and local market
Fertilizers	Strategic	Food security and agricultural inputs
Petrochemicals	Strategic	Added value and non-oil exports
Reinjection	Technical / oil-related	Supporting reservoirs and reducing flaring when a nearby market is absent
LNG/FSRU	Reserve only	Summer peak and emergencies, not a permanent base

Reference: World Bank / GFMR 2026; policy analysis in this report.

6 Current Projects and the Implementation Gap

Iraq does not start from zero. The real challenge is to measure delivered gas, not only design capacity.

Iraq does not start from zero. The Basrah Gas Company experience is important, and IFC financing for it is evidence that flaring-reduction projects are financeable if they have an operating company, cash flows, contracts, and measurement. The GFMR 2025 report states that IFC financing for Basrah Gas Company reached USD 360 million, distributed as USD 137.76 million from IFC’s own account, USD 180 million through participation by 8 international banks, and USD 42.24 million through the Managed Co-Lending Portfolio Program. The project is also expected to reduce about 10 million tonnes CO2e annually.

However, the problem is not only the existence of projects. The problem is the difference between design capacity and gas actually delivered. Therefore, success should not be measured by the number of projects or by nominal capacity only. Five monthly numbers must be measured:

Table 12: Five monthly questions to measure project performance

Question	Why is it important?
1. How much was flaring before the project?	To define the baseline
2. How much did it become after the project?	To measure real reduction
3. How much gas entered processing?	To know plant operation
4. How much actually reached electricity or industry?	To measure economic value
5. How much imported fuel or gas was displaced?	To measure the dollar and budget impact

7 MARS, Satellites, and the Control Ledger

The next step is not another narrative strategy, but a monthly measurement system that converts alerts and field data into decisions.

The IEA/UNEP report on the Methane Alert and Response System – MARS explains that the system was launched in 2023 to provide free alerts to governments and companies on major methane emission events using satellites and artificial intelligence. However, it states that the global response rate in 2025 was only about 12%. This means that the presence of an alert alone is not enough. What is required is a government body that receives the alert and turns it into action. The proposed Iraqi protocol is:

Figure 11: Proposed Iraqi protocol for MARS alerts

Reference: IEA/UNEP, Responding to Satellite Notifications from MARS.

Table 13: Proposed Iraqi protocol for MARS alerts

Step	Procedure
1	Receive and classify the alert
2	Notify the operator within a specified period
3	The operator responds technically and operationally
4	Verify through satellites or inspection
5	Document the event in a national database

Reference: IEA/UNEP, Responding to Satellite Notifications from MARS.

Proposed national control ledger

The GFMR 2025 report explains that not knowing where and how much gas is being flared makes prioritization difficult and weakens commercial and climate finance, because finance needs a documented baseline and verifiable performance. Correct measurement also enables the state to impose fees, taxes, or fines on the basis of actual volumes rather than estimates. Therefore, we propose establishing a national control ledger for associated gas for each field, updated monthly:

Table 14: Proposed monthly associated gas control ledger

Item	What must be measured
Produced gas	By field and operator
Captured gas	At the gathering point
Gas entering processing	At the plant gate
Delivered dry gas	To electricity or industry
Produced LPG/NGL	Quantities and value
Flared gas	Routine, safety, non-routine
Reasons for stoppage	Compressor, pipeline, plant, buyer
Satellite reading	Independent verification
Emissions	CO2 and methane
Financial impact	Fuel substituted, imports reduced, value added

Reference: World Bank / GFMR 2025; IEA/UNEP MARS guidance; policy proposal in this report.

8 Recommendations

The recommended policy shift is from project announcements to measured gas delivery and a binding gas-before-oil rule.

1. Adopt the number 18.18 bcm in 2024 as a temporary official baseline for the government report.
2. Adopt the following explanatory comparison in the report: flared gas in Iraq equals about 164% of marketed gas, according to a comparison of 18.18 bcm flared with 11.073 bcm marketed gas.
3. Establish a national control ledger for associated gas that links field, plant, electricity, and satellite data.
4. Set a clear government condition: no oil expansion without a gas pathway that is financed and linked to a buyer.
5. Make LNG/FSRU a seasonal and emergency reserve, not a permanent substitute for local associated gas.
6. Use the Basrah Gas Company model and IFC financing as a practical reference, especially as the loan amounted to USD 360 million and is expected to reduce about 10 million tonnes CO2e annually.
7. Establish a national protocol for responding to MARS alerts.
8. Link the associated gas file to Iraq’s economic vision: stable electricity, reduced dollar demand, local industry, and reduced carbon intensity of Iraqi oil.

Conclusion

In the end, we wish to clarify that Iraq does not lack gas. Rather, it lacks a system that transforms associated gas from a flame into value. The documented number of 18.18 bcm in 2024 is not only an environmental number. It equals a daily resource of 49.8 million m3, a local theoretical value of about USD 2.75 billion annually, and a theoretical electricity capacity exceeding 11 GW before losses. In a country that depends decisively on oil for public revenues, and faces a shortage in electricity as well as pressure on imports and the dollar, capturing associated gas becomes one of the fastest paths to energy and financial sovereignty. The required decision is not merely the announcement of a new project, but changing the rule of work:

Oil does not expand alone, and gas does not remain subordinate.

Every additional barrel of oil must carry with it a clear gas pathway, financed, measured, and connected to electricity or industry.

References Adopted in the Report

Reference	Use in the report
World Bank / GFMR, Global Gas Flaring Tracker Report 2026	Global flaring figures for 2025, economic value, and concentration of flaring in major countries
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, NG 204, 2026	Iraq series 2012-2024 and analysis of the reasons for the persistence of flaring
World Bank / GFMR, Global Gas Flaring Tracker Report 2025	Measurement methodology, ZRF 2030, financing, Basrah Gas Company model, and methane risks
International Gas Union, World LNG Report 2026	LNG trade, prices, shipping, import terminals, and the effect of Hormuz
OPEC, Annual Statistical Bulletin 2025	Iraq’s basic economic, oil and gas figures
IEA/UNEP, Responding to Satellite Notifications from MARS	Protocol for responding to methane alerts
BTI, Iraq 2026	Economic and financial background, electricity, and oil dependence