Basically, the “State Administration Coalition”, which emerged at the end of 2022, was an alliance to form a government following the fragmentation of the tripartite alliance “Save a Homeland”, which marked the end of 2021 for the same purpose. Although the two titles have their political connotations in the midst of events, the term “state administration” carries connotations that go beyond government action to what is like trying to find a space in the midst of the most controversial differences to resolve some of the most controversial issues, political polarizations and electoral scrambles, including providing the protection required for the agreement between the federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government on financial financing, or providing political cover for the government in order to play its role in managing and organizing the relationship with the United States of America, and the two matters continued to provoke jurisprudence close to the age of the age of the political process itself.

 

“Coordination framework”

 

Although there are those who like to attribute the government of Sayyid Muhammad Shia Al-Sudani exclusively to the forces of the Shiite framework, it is in fact the product of the forces formed by the “State Administration Coalition” that brings together the most prominent elites and political leaders of the dominant forces in the House of Representatives.

 

This experience may not be new in Iraq. There were meetings of the leaders of the blocs in previous stages attended by the presidencies to discuss the most sensitive issues, which resulted in important positions, but they did not turn into a more systematic and specific context as it is today, and that this may represent a starting point worth studying in two integrated aspects: one of them relates to all the necessities of comprehensive reform in Iraq and addressing the errors of establishment by thinking about the methodology of “re-establishment” and overcoming the challenges facing the state, and the second concerns creating a more transparent and transparent understanding space to prevent the confusion between “state management” in the sense of working to protect it, in the sense known in Iraq of quotas in the sites “sharing the government” and the enslaving the general course of it and the government.

 

It is possible to go into a survey about what this proposal can be accused of enshrining “consensus” as the “shares” that have exhausted the state and its institutions, and also perhaps the accusation of undermining the democratic process and obliterating the role of elections in achieving representation and then the expected change.

 

However, many elections (any elections) are not expected to achieve in the path of deep political reform in Iraq. The elections have often been accompanied so far by the division and dramatic events that ravaged Iraq, starting from the civil war, which followed the first version of the end of the 2005 parliamentary and constitutional vote, while the severe political division after the 2010 elections still casts heavy shadows on the Iraqi situation, which witnessed one of its most dangerous stages with the emergence of ISIS immediately after the 2014 elections, which is the harshest event on the Iraqi self and the most influential in the entire political process. The demonstrations of “October” 2019 cannot be understood in isolation from the repercussions of those events, while some of their direct meanings refer to the results of the 2018 elections, which prompted an important political force such as the “Wisdom” movement to announce explicit parliamentary opposition, and the 2021 elections were not better off, as they witnessed a very dangerous political division that ended with the withdrawal of the Sadist movement from the entire political process.

 

Today, the 2026 elections are suffering the same dangerous show, as they open the door to new conflicts over positions, and the differences of their political forces put Iraq in a major international crisis, one of whose aspects was embodied in the tweet of US President Donald Trump, whose conflict allowed Iraq to intervene to reject the candidate of the “frame”.

 

It would be unfair to stigmatize the elections as one of the causes of the crises in Iraq, but the Iraqi foundational questions that have not been answered since 2003 are the real perpetrator, and as a gloom addition, those floating questions imposed not to take elections and integrate with economic reform, administrative development and self-democratic healing as they deserve to do.

 

“Congenial atrophia” in the political process

 

What can be described as “congenital atrophy” in the political process, which did not allow elections to take their natural role in ensuring healing, also did not allow successive governments to implement deep reforms that can be established in the future, because deep reform needs deep and sometimes revolutionary measures, and necessarily difficult and painful, some of which are outside the competence of the government, while others will not be able to bear its results in light of the state of division and crowds that turns each step at this level into what looks like “political suicide”.

 

As a signal, the state, through its institutions and experts, was referring to the complex crises experienced by Iraq, especially in the political and economic fields, not to mention its worsening social crises. With different trends on how to face those crises, all of them, without exception, collided and collided with the walls of a political format based on strolling and trolling, while deep reform needs a long time and continuous efforts, and the most dangerous thing is that it may need what is close to “unanimity” within the scope of a general political and social understanding.

 

Time when it’s wasted

 

States can not wait for the opportunities and waste available from them in a world witnessing a rapid technological revolution that is a comprehensive change in concepts and priorities and a completely different level of challenges from those produced by the industrial revolution. There is almost consensus that the twenties and 1930s represent an available opportunity that may be the last opportunity for all countries of the world to adapt to the challenges, and this adaptation is not limited to economic and developmental programs, but political, social and cultural adaptation in terms of leaving a stage and receiving another.

 

Major countries such as the United States of America, the European Community, China, Russia and the Southeast Asian Community, regardless of the nature of their political systems and decision-making mechanisms, have embarked since the beginning of the new millennium to make major shifts in the mechanisms of domestic production and resource management and in re-understanding the state and its future role. When it is said that great economic pressures exerted by these countries on their peoples to change the lifestyle and activate production at the expense of the individual income levels that prevailed, this is in line with the requirements of the responsibility of the state in preparing its people to deal with and face challenges.

 

At the level of the Middle East, an oil country like the United Arab Emirates did not give in to the reasons for relaxation provided by oil revenues and went early in that continuous and sometimes difficult and expensive adaptation, and these same motives are found in a key country in the region such as Saudi Arabia, which hastened in the past few years to address the obstacles to internal change and open the door to society to strengthen its own immunity.

 

Although the economic sanctions imposed on Iran are, in principle, an economic undermining factor, Tehran has no doubt turned this challenge into a great opportunity in terms of changing domestic production traditions, and Turkey has done the same, as did Egypt without sanctions.

 

As a systematic point, countries that began deep reform early or delayed, such as Argentina recently, have exposed their peoples to uneasy pressures and have suffered and are suffering from economic crises and bruises in their traditional social and cultural systems, and their per capita income levels in general have decreased before gradually recovery again and recovering or on the way to that or at least have the elements of recovery, something that does not seem difficult to observe everywhere and regardless of the motivations for change or the challenges that push towards it.

 

It is not limited to the fact that the world is moving at an accelerated pace for alternative energy sources, for example, but that the mechanisms, laws and relations of production in all fields are evolving and changing to inflame a great and merciful competition, which is a basic matter that required countries to exert more pressure on their social, economic and administrative buildings at this stage due to the actual need for more work and production according to the new mechanisms and equations.

 

Iraq.. And deep reform

 

As a simple equation agreed upon by most economists, Iraq has 10 years at the latest to reduce dependence on its oil imports, which today exceed 90% to reach 30% and below that percentage as well.

 

Providing non-oil imports that fill at least 70% of Iraq’s budget in nearly one decade does not only mean diversifying sources of production, but also bringing about a comprehensive change in understanding the role and duties of the state and its relationship with society, getting rid of most non-productive government institutions and revolutionizing the administrative and legal system, reducing the number of government employees to less than a quarter of their current number and changing people’s work culture in general.

 

All this cannot be done in the current or future Iraqi situation at the hands of a government, no matter how sincere intention, which is a path that cannot be pursued before the reproduction of decision-making mechanisms, and before that, the solution of the major social and political crises and the consolidation of the unity of the state and its ability to impose its decision and reach a clear meaningful result on the method of reform, whether according to the concept of the totalitarian state leading the economy similar to the Chinese experience, or according to the Western liberal perspective.

 

Since 2003, the Iraqi state has been facing one detailed question that will be answered today by reducing the cost tomorrow, namely: “Which is the first priority of completing the construction of constitutional institutions and resolving internal and external political and social crises before starting deep reform procedures for fear of tearing the state and exposing it in a fragile situation to internal anger and thus external investment in this anger, or starting immediately and letting the reform mechanisms take their paths and impose their patterns on the political, economic, social and cultural life in Iraq to adapt to the crises that the reform will create?”

 

The reality is that it is not possible to wait for future decades to determine where the Iraqis are putting their feet, and just as it is not possible to venture into serious reform measures without prior social preparation, this readiness should not include pushing governments under pressure to reformist adventures that are not tolerated, adopted and defended by everyone without exception, and in a way that ensures that any party prevents the investment of the negative side effects expected inevitably in the activation of social repercusions that threaten the whole country.

 

Accordingly, the reference to the “State Administration Coalition” or any new name that brings together the leaders of the various Iraqi forces and representations as it could be a valid building block to answer those outstanding questions if two basic conditions were met:

 

First: To devote his work to establishing the fateful decisions required by deep reform, including constitutional reforms.

Second: To expand the scope of his representation to include influential forces regardless of their participation in the government or not.

 

The philosophy of the House of Representatives in essence applies to the previous requirements, but the Iraqi parliamentary experience was not typical in performing this role over the past two decades, and it is not really expected that there will be a radical change in the course of parliament’s work in the coming years. On the other hand, the Iraqi experience has produced political leaderships outside the parliamentary and governmental work, and these leaderships practically decide the paths of the state, and regardless of whether it is true or wrong, this is the equation that exists today in Iraq. We have the option of waiting for their change to return to normal, and this may require several decades to come, or invest these leaderships and push them to contribute together to the deep reform measures, defend them and face their repercussions.

 

It can be noted that the Iraqi Federal Court, apart from the political reactions to its decisions, starting from the issue of the session of the election of the President of the Republic to the settlement of the salaries of the employees of the Kurdistan Region, had thrown a heavy stone in the stagnant pond and pushed everyone to think publicly in search of solutions. It says that any situation that some may consider incorrect, interpretable or a source of dispute must be addressed through a “national agreement”, no matter how much effort and price it requires, including amending the constitution or conducting comprehensive reviews if necessary. And with…