Post-Iranian regime scenarios

Washington’s calculations and their repercussions on Iraq

In recent years – and at a higher pace in recent months – international debates about the future of Iran in the event of the collapse of the existing system of governance. The warnings are repeated that the biggest challenge is not the “fall of the regime” per se, but rather running a post-stage and preventing it from turning into a vast power vacuum that opens the door to chaos.

Within this context, two syneral questions arise: What are the realistic scenarios of the post-collapse phase? And does Washington have a coherent, practical perception of dealing with every path?

Direct backgrounds: internal pressures and erosion of networks of influence

Research and media readings gather that Iran’s internal environment has become more fragile due to the overlap of three pressure paths: frequent waves of protest, a deep economic crisis, and security hardening that makes any sudden disintegration of the coercive structure an entrance to chaos instead of organized transition.

Economically, the Rand Corporation points to the deterioration of the currency by more than 60% within a year, with inflation exceeding 40% and expectations of continued pressures in 2026.

Politically and security, the Revolutionary Guards emerges as a potential actor in the transition, as the most cohesive institution and organizational capacity compared to the rest of the actors. On the other hand, the same analyses confirm the absence of reliable indications of a unified opposition leadership capable of running a country the size of Iran immediately in the event of a sudden collapse.

All possibilities are presented

The “probabilities of the day after” in the literature discussing Iran are distributed into a package of cross-scenarios, and can be summarized in eight major titles (with intersections between them):

1. Direct military control/Republic of the Guards (Pakistani-Egyptian model or long military rule).
2. ” Security first” with a Putin version/Russian model: a security elite that redefines legitimacy on a national-military basis instead of religious ideology.
3. Pragmatic openness/Chinese model: political repression with legitimacy redirected towards the economy and national interest.
4. Nuclear tightening and isolation/North Korean model: more ideology, repression and linking survival to a nuclear deterrent. This means that the system remains.
5. Chaos/disintegration/civil war (Syrian-Libyan model) with a clash of national-regional power centers and tensions; it may amount to partial disintegration or the rise of local entities.
6. Managed/orderly transition: the removal of the head of power and the formation of transitional arrangements that preserve the central state without guaranteeing immediate democracy.
7. A fragile democratic transition: a civilian government faces the risk of swallowing the “deep state” of the nascent experience.
8. Partial overhaul/“weaker continuation”: the system survives and continues through suppression and limited adjustments without radical transformation.

The most likely scenarios

When studying possible scenarios, a set of governing effects emerges:

• It is difficult to assume that the United States may accept – if it goes towards the overthrow of the regime – the existence of a nuclear or missile deterrent in the hands of Iran; otherwise, the option of “overthrowing the regime” would not have become the table in the first place. Thus, any American path towards the overthrow of the regime presupposes a parallel plan to quickly remove the “danger” weapons before they fall into the hands of armed militias that may consist of the remnants of the Revolutionary Guards or others, or before armed elements flow from outside Iran (such as Afghanistan and Pakistan).
• The Iranian regime has succeeded for decades in weakening any ready-made alternative inside and outside Iran that can immediately take power. This reinforces the regime’s own behavior; a few days ago, most of the leaders of the reformist movement – who are part of the system itself – were arrested against the background of a closed meeting in which they deliberated that the leader could step down in favor of symbols from within the regime to “save the regime from falling”. This kind of political control narrows the likelihood that a political group “from within the regime” will lead a smooth process of change.
• The bloody repression of the regime last month to eliminate the popular protests reduced the chances of the street accepting an alternative from within the regime, and raised the ceiling of the demand towards a full crossing of it, not restoring it.
• The great ethnic and sectarian diversity in Iran, and the accompanying sensitivity and sense of non-Persian and non-Shia, may make the moment of transition an opportunity to raise human rights and political demands in a way that may take sharp forms if central control is absent.

Based on this, the following paths look more likely:

Track I: “Republic of the Military”

This scenario assumes the shift of the center of gravity from religious legitimacy to security-military legitimacy, through the rise of a group of middle leaders – not popularly known – from the army, the Revolutionary Guards and other security services, to take over the rule with or without a political front, while reducing the role of the religious institution.

This path puts Washington in front of a paradox: a system that is necessarily less religiously ideological, but more disciplined and capable of managing regional deterrence and blackmail.

The meaning of Iraq: The possibility of “adapting” the forces associated with Iranian influence inside Iraq quickly to maintain their positions, through a more local axis and mitigation of cross-border ideological linkage.

Track 2: “Iranian Putin” with a security elite

In this path, the transformations are not limited to the “militarization of government,” but extend to the redefinition of political identity from “revolutionary Islamicism” to “security nationalism” that invests the discourse of oppression and external hostility as a legalization mechanism.

Washington may be inclined to treat it as “more negotiable” than a revolutionary theocracy, but it will collide with its security architecture, raising the cost of strategic concessions internally and limiting the space for maneuver

The indication for Iraq: The possibility of “managing influence” instead of “exporting ideology” increases, which may open a limited window to reset the rules of engagement inside Iraq, provided that Baghdad has sovereign and coherent negotiation tools.

Track 3: Chaos and Disintegration/Civil War

It is the most expensive scenario on the region. It is based on the disintegration of the central authority and the conflict of power centers, with national-regional tensions rushing into an open clash, producing waves of displacement and transboundary unrest.

This scenario exposes the difference between having “perceptions” and having a “vacuum management plan”: a chaos the size of Iran raises the risk of proliferation and security escape beyond the ability of any limited intervention to control.

The meaning of Iraq: the risks of soft borders, economic consequences, and the return of the activation of smuggling and weapons networks. Risks usually escalate with the collapse of states, without the possibility of ascertaining their level before the event occurs.

Where does Washington stand? A gap between “scenario knowledge” and owning a strategy

Published analyses suggest that Washington is dealing with the possibility of change through “multiple scenarios” without a clear weighting or announced plan for the next day, making politics closer to managing a crisis at a minimum than engineering a transition.

From another angle, a report issued by the Congressional Research Service points out that the American debate centers on scenarios for intervention and its repercussions, reflecting the presence of the file within the legislative institution, but it does not decide the question: How is the vacuum managed if the chaos increases?

Iraqi perspective: flexible sovereignty instead of dependence on the axes

For decision-makers in Baghdad, whichever is the closest Iranian path, Iraq will be at the heart of the rebound wave. Therefore, three practical priorities stand out:

1. Transforming the relationship into “flexible sovereignty/flexible independence” by strengthening the state’s tools in the borders, economy and monopolying the security decision, instead of waiting for “who governs Tehran.”
2. Repositioning of armed and political actors: In the scenario of militarization, “putinism” or even disintegration, the motivations of internal “adaptation” will rise to maintain the lead, creating a test moment for the balance of the state, society and politics.
3. Opening a window to end political alienation: the decline of cross-border ideological influence – if it happens – may allow Iraqi elites, including civilian and secular forces, to expand participation

The effect is within a non-exclusionary realistic horizon.

Conclusion

The next day in Iran – if a sudden collapse or disintegration occurs – is not “one scenario”, but a package of paths ranging from the militarization of government in its various forms, hardening fortification, or breakthroughs to chaos, while an organized civil transition remains a possibility in principle, but it is the most difficult to translate on the ground: it requires a minimum of inclusive political consensus, a legitimate transitional leadership, and an agreed road map that ensures the continuity of the state and its apparatus and prevents the slippage of security. However, this path collides with two coherent realities; the first is that state institutions, even if shaken, still show indicators of coherence that make the keys to “smooth transition” less able to snatch out of super-arrangements or understandings within the ruling elite. The second is the absence of a unified alternative capable of filling the vacuum quickly, both within the opposition and between social actors, which weakens the chances of producing a transitional civilian authority with the capacity of control and administration.

For Iraq, it is not enough to limit the discussion to the question “Do you realize Washington?”, but more importantly, turning it into an Iraqi executive policy that is managed by the mind of a state, not by reactions. The essence of the challenge is to build brakes that prevent the rebounds of any Iranian shock from moving inland through channels of security, economy and politics, and to protect institutions from polarization or disintegration under the pressure of regional alignments.

This requires redefining Iraq from an “arena” of conflicts to a “actor” with a margin of decision through flexible sovereignty: practical sovereignty based on maneuvering and protecting interests without cutting bridges, translating into border control, proactive management of energy, trade, currency and smuggling files, and fortifying the domestic front so that Iraq does not become a platform for settling accounts or a corridor for the collapses of others.

Accordingly, the question becomes: What is the package of measures that ensure the continuity of the state at the time of shocks – an economic emergency plan that reduces dependence and confusion, a security protocol that prevents the eruption of weapons and the multiplicity of decision-making centers, and a diplomatic approach that preserves the lines of communication and gives Iraq the role of mediator when needed – to turn it from a recipient of shock